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It was a ruling which surprised no one.  Despite a deliberation which spanned 
6 months - during which, according to Lord Wilson, the appeals were debated “with 
an intensity unique in [his] experience” - the Supreme Court’s much-awaited decision 
in the case brought by Nicklinson, Lamb and ‘Martin’ was not altogether unexpected: 
that if the law on assisted suicide were to change, it is a task best undertaken by 
Parliament. It is a viewpoint which the judiciary has articulated on a number of 
previous occasions. The Court nevertheless confirmed that it has jurisdiction to 
declare whether s.2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 is compatible with Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Yet with the exception of Lady 
Hale and Lord Kerr, the remaining 7 judges refused to make a declaration of 
incompatibility on the evidence before them. They preferred to allow Parliament the 
opportunity to review s.2(1) unburdened by the weight of such a declaration.  
But if the continuous stream of high profile cases, of which the present one is 
only the latest, often gave the impression that Parliament has taken a passive stance 
on the issue, the lead judgement given by Lord Neuberger signalled that this is an 
erroneous conclusion. Parliament, after criminalising assisted suicide through s.2(1), 
has vigorously resisted repeated efforts from private members to liberalise the law. 
Not only that, it has in fact expanded the reach of this law in recent times through 
s.59 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 by bringing any assistance and 
encouragement provided through the internet within the purview of s.2(1).  
Concessions have thus far only been won through battles fought in the 
courtroom over the rigidity, clarity and constitutionality of the law. But these are 
inevitably conferred in a reactive and piecemeal fashion. Looking back, when Diane 
Pretty failed to secure a guarantee from the DPP that her husband, Brian Pretty, 
would be immune from prosecution if he assisted her to die in a manner they did not 
specify, Debbie Purdie’s legal team knew better than to seek the same immunity for 
her husband Omar Puentes who was equally willing to assist her to die. Rather, their 
challenge centred around the absence of clear criteria of how the DPP would 
exercise the discretion granted by s.2(4) of the Suicide Act 1961 of whether or not to 
consent to a prosecution for s.2(1) offences. When the House of Lords ordered for 
the promulgation of an offence-specific policy, the DPP duly complied by issuing the 
Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide in 
February 2010 i.e. within months of the ruling. However, since Debbie Purdy had 
specified that the assistance she had in mind was for her husband to accompany her 
to the Dignitas Clinic in Zurich, the guidelines issued therein were by and large 
addressing the circumstances they presented. Because of this, although ‘Martin’ too 
had planned to die at the Dignitas Clinic, he had to seek clarification over whether 
doctors and others not within his circle of family and friends would be prosecuted if 
they were to extend him their assistance as his wife had refused to do what Omar 
Puentes was willing to do. Since the Supreme Court has strongly hinted that the 
DPP should review the policy to address the concerns brought by ‘Martin’, there is a 
chance that this too would lead to another piecemeal concession if the DPP confines 
her eventual review to the narrow set of circumstances raised by ‘Martin’.   
As for those who are unable to travel to Zurich like Paul Lamb and the late 
Tony Nicklinson, the DPP’s policy is consequently of limited relevance. But inspired 
as they were by the acknowledgement gained by Diane Pretty from the European 
Court of Human Rights that her Article 8(1) right had been infringed – a point 
reconfirmed recently in Haas v. Switzerland (2011), Koch v. Germany (2013) and 
Gross v Switzerland (2014) for patients in not vastly dissimilar situations, Lamb and 
Nicklinson’s widow thereby questioned the constitutionality of s.2(1) in the light of the 
ECHR. Although the Supreme Court has, as we know, refused to take a firm stand 
on this point on this particular occasion, assisted suicide is already being debated 
again in Parliament. However, since Lord Falconer’s Assisted Dying Bill only 
addresses the issue vis-à-vis terminally ill patients, the discussions are not 
comprehensive enough to incorporate situations affecting patients like Pretty, Purdy, 
Lamb and Nicklinson.  
This highlights the need for a more wide-ranging Parliamentary debate. 
Before this is embarked on, it is worth remembering that the inroads already made 
through case law - not only in assisted suicide cases but also in other cases where a 
third party is involved in bringing life to an end, have left the current law in an 
anomalous situation. While s.2(1) has stated in unequivocal terms that assisted 
suicide is a crime which is punishable with up to 14 years imprisonment, those who 
altruistically assist their loved ones to die abroad at the Dignitas Clinic would not be 
prosecuted, thanks in large part to the DPP’s policy. Thus assistance rendered on 
British soil attracts significant opprobrium and legal repercussions, but those 
rendered abroad do not. Also, cases like Re AK (2001) and Re B (2002) indicate that 
the wishes of competent adults to end their lives by asking their doctors to switch off 
their mechanical ventilators would have to be respected. However, the wishes of 
similarly competent adults for doctors to help end their lives through the 
administration of lethal injections are prohibited. Yet at the same time, courts have 
condoned the administration of opioids in dosages that are known would result in the 
abbreviation of life. Further, courts have declared it lawful for doctors to allow 
patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) to die by removing and discontinuing 
all life-sustaining treatment, including clinically assisted nutrition and hydration, 
notwithstanding the fact that such patients’ heartbeat and breathing are still 
functioning naturally. Thus when the issues that came to the fore in this Supreme 
Court case do make it to Parliament, ideally those related areas are also revisited 
and be subjected to equally extensive public debate. This would imbue the law 
relating to the bringing of human life to an end by a third party with coherence and a 
solid underlying rationale. 
